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CONVERSATION EXCHANGE DYNAMICS: A NEW SIGNAL PRIMITIVE FOR COMPUTER
NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION
John C. McEachen*, John M. Zachary**,Junling Wang** and Kah Wai Cheng*
*Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
ABSTRACT
As distributed network intrusion detection systems expand
to integrate hundreds and possibly thousands of sensors,
managing and presenting the associated sensor data becomes
an increasingly complex task. Methods of intelligent data
reduction are needed to make sense of the wide dimensional
variations. We present a new signal primitive we call
conversation exchange dynamics (CED) that accentuates
anomalies in traffic flow. This signal provides an aggregated
primitive that may be used by intrusion detection systems to
base detection strategies upon. Indications of the signal in a
variety of simulated and actual anomalous network traffic
from distributed sensor collections are presented.
Specifically, attacks from the MIT Lawrence Livermore IDS
data set are considered. We conclude that CED presents a
useful signal primitive for assistance in conducting IDS.

Index Terms—Intrusion detection, network diagnostics,
statistical mechanics.
I.

U

INTRODUCTION

nderstanding network behavior for the purposes of
diagnosis and intrusion detection is currently a major
effort in the quest to build secure, robust and dependable
computing systems. Specifically, intrusion detection
systems (IDS) are detection security mechanisms that
monitor a computer system or network, attempt to detect
malicious activity, and raise an alarm to system or security
administrators. IDSs can be classified as either anomalybased detection or signature-based detection [1]. The
former approach detects anomalous behavior, which may
be a superset of undesirable behavior, and generally
suffers from high false alarm rates. The latter signaturebased approach may reduce false alarm rates but generally
depends on a well-defined security policy to base
detection on. Furthermore, signature-based intrusion
detection systems are unable to detect events for which a
signature is not defined in their signature database.
The recent trend in intrusion detection is to deploy a
large number of sensors throughout an organization’s
network with the hope of gaining visibility into all areas of
the network ([2],[3]). The unfortunate consequence of this
approach is that the network administrator is overwhelmed
with a plethora of somewhat information. Consequently, a
new trend in IDS has developed in the area of data
reduction [4].
We present a novel approach to modeling distributed
system with a high number of interacting entities. This
problem is notoriously complex, and our model seeks to
provide some level of data reduction so as to distinguish
what is an anomaly from what is typical network activity.
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Consequently, this technique has the potential to find
applicability to a wide variety of systems (beyond
computer network systems).
Efforts related to our approach can be found in [5], [6]
and [7]. These approaches all consider the problem from
the abstraction of determining statistical properties of the
network. In this paper, however, we intend to focus on
the analysis of the underlying state descriptors with the
hope of extending these to global properties in the future.
II. DESCRIBING NETWORK CONVERSATION FLOW
As was stated before, the goal of our approach is to
reduce standard network data into a useful, reproducible,
and meaningful form, ultimately to allow accurate
detection of network anomalies. The notion of state will
be more carefully defined below, but quickly summarizes
into activity levels of various conversation groups within
the network. One end product is a real time threedimensional signal description of the configuration of the
network.
The network is constructed as a state space of
information sources and sinks. As information quanta
move throughout a network, the state space is updated

r

accordingly. States are represented as a vector v of
sources and sinks. The analogy used is that of buckets and
balls. Information moves between nodes represented as
buckets as indivisible balls. As the network moves
information around, this is represented as balls being
passed between buckets. For example, a series of n
packets transmitted from a node Na to another node Nb
would be modeled as n balls moved from bucket X and
placed in bucket Y. The association of node Na with either
bucket X or Y depends on the nature of the conversation.
The bucket can be defined using any combination of
conversation characteristics including the affiliation of
who is talking (individual hosts or networks), the language
they are speaking (TCP, UDP, or ICMP), or the job they
are performing (client or server).
In its simplest form, each node in a network is
associated with one or more buckets and the total number
of packets exchanged between nodes is modeled as
moving balls from bucket to bucket. The collection of all
buckets together with the allowable distribution range of
balls forms a bucket state space.
The bucket state space includes an initial distribution of
balls among the buckets (corresponding to a computer
network with an expected distribution of information).
This initial distribution forms an initial condition for the
bucket state space. Likewise, the allowable bucket state
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spaces are assumed to be represented by a set of boundary
conditions.
A state transition causes a shift in the distribution of
information between the buckets. In other words, this
model translates network behavior into bucket state
transitions by selecting a ball from the bucket matching
the source characteristics of the packet and moving that
ball into the bucket matching the destination
characteristics of the packet, thereby redistributing the
information and transitioning the state.
Figures 1 and 2 show the importance of the state walk,
and how the model provides more information than a
simpler model. Both signals represent a state space walk
made up of two conversation groups, bucket A and bucket
B, and they start with 5 balls each. As stated before, a
network exchange can cause a state transition in three
ways: by moving a ball from bucket A to bucket B, by
moving a ball from bucket B to bucket A, or by either
moving a ball from bucket A to bucket A or bucket B to
bucket B, essentially resulting in no change for that
period.

point and the general path in-between, and the state
counts.
By examining the manifold, or canyon, developed by
collecting various state histograms over time, anomalies
can be easily spotted as perturbations in the normal flow
of the canyon. The cause of such dramatic changes in
practice ranges from a single transition to many thousands
of packets.
An anomaly can cause one of two effects in the canyon
signal. Either new states are visited, or previously visited
states are seen more often. The first effect will cause a
spike oriented along the z-axis and the latter along the yaxis. An anomaly that is orthogonal to the normal traffic
flow will tend to cause a spike oriented along the z-axis,
due to the new states visited. An anomaly that is parallel
to the normal traffic flow will tend to cause a spike
oriented along the y-axis, due to the revisiting of
previously visited states. The magnitude of the potential
spike is what determines the ability of the operator to
detect the anomaly. The orientation of the anomaly with
respect to the normal traffic flow will determine the
magnitude of the perturbation. A single packet anomaly
that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow will cause a
large perturbation in the signal, where a packet that is
parallel to the normal traffic flow will cause a relatively
small perturbation. The less orthogonal the anomaly is to
the normal traffic flow, the larger the number of
anomalous packets required to cause a noticeable
perturbation in the signal response.

Fig 1. A sample state walk for a two bucket model. (Top left) A plot of
the state walk over time. (Top right) A plot of the bucket sizes over the
course of the state walk. (Bottom) A ranked histogram of the bucket
states over the entire time period of this state walk.

The paths shown in the figure 1 and 2 share a few
notable similarities. The paths begin and end at the same
state and undergo the same number and types of state
changes, including five changes up, seven down, and four
no changes. However, the transitions that make up those
changes produce remarkably different paths, shown on the
left hand side of the figures, and those paths produce
remarkably different state counts, shown on the right hand
side of the figures. Thus it is shown that this model
provides a number of unique discriminators including
number and type of state changes, starting and ending

Fig 2. An alternative state walk for a same two bucket model as shown in
fig 1. (Top left) A plot of the state walk over time. (Top right) A plot of
the bucket sizes over the course of the state walk. (Bottom) A ranked
histogram of the bucket states over the entire time period of this state
walk. Note how the histogram varies for this state walk even though both
examples end in the same state.

For example, figure 3(a) represents all of the possible
bucket states that are contained in the bucket state space
for a system consisting of three buckets (a, b, and c) each
containing four balls. Each of the blue nodes represents a

different bucket state. The number of balls in a given
bucket is given by the lines parallel to the side opposite
the vertex of interest. Each of the vertices corresponds to
the case where all of the balls are in the associated bucket.
The purple node represents the initial ball distribution, or
initial bucket state of {4, 4, 4} . In figure 3(b), the
number of balls in bucket ‘c’ is constant at four. The thick
green line represents the nine possible bucket states based
on a conversation between the remaining two buckets.
An example of the results of a single packet anomaly,
that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow, can be seen in
figure 4. In this case the packet caused a ball to move
from bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’
and ‘b’. The result is a new line of possible bucket states.
This new line contains ten possible bucket states. Given
that the data from any given sample window is averaged
over a historic window of time there are now nineteen
possible bucket states, which is more than double the
original number of nine. This results in a run out (in the zaxis direction) of the canyon signal. This type of anomaly
is very easy to detect even though it was caused by a
single packet.
c

a

the expected anomalous traffic in advance, the key is to
create a collection of bucket spaces that provide a tight
classification of critical traffic. For example, traffic
should be parsed by functional group, like web servers, as
opposed to grouping servers and clients together.
This notion of orthoganlity is illustrated in figure 5. In
this example the signal response for two diametric attacks
sorted through the bucket space are shown. This bucket
space in particular is designed to show conversations of
SMTP traffic. In the first, an ICMP denial of service
attack shows insignificant response in the signal response.
On the contrary, a mailbomb attack using the SMTP
protocol clearly identifies the anomalous SMTP traffic.

c

b

{a,b,c} = {4,4,4}

a

(a)

b

{a,b,c} = {x,8-x,4}
(b)

Fig. 3. Graphics that depict the total bucket state space for a system
containing three buckets each with four balls. Each node corresponds to
a different bucket state. – (a) The purple node corresponds to the bucket
state of

{4, 4, 4} . (b) The green line represents the range of possible

bucket states for a conversation between buckets ‘a’ and ‘b’.
y
c

Fig. 5. (Top) Signal response of an orthogonal attack (ICMP flood)
against a bucket space monitoring e-mail exchanges (SMTP). (Bottom)
Signal response of a mailbomb attack against the same mail server.

x

a

{x,8-x,4}

{x,9-x,3}

b

Fig. 4. A graphic depicting the results of an anomalous packet that is
orthogonal to the normal traffic flow. The anomalous packet causes a
ball to move from bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’
and ‘b’. The results is the state walk moves from the line at
the line at

c = 3.

c=4

to

The more orthogonal anomalous traffic is to the normal
traffic flow, the greater effect the anomaly will have on
the signal response. Since it is not possible to know all

There is a limit to the number of buckets a
configuration can have, ideally, multiple instances of the
system should be run concurrently to allow for smaller
bucket spaces. This is also beneficial in reducing the
complexity of interpreting the signal space which
increases with the number of buckets. The next section
presents some of the analysis on actual network traffic.

III. EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
This section is divided into two parts: controlled
experiments conducted laboratory test equipment and
results from real traffic on operational networks.
A. Laboratory experiments
The purpose of these experiments was to show how the
bucket state histogram varies as the bucket space
description deviates from the actual network
configuration. Two categories of experiments are
discussed. The first shows the effect of an increasing
number of rogue web servers on the bucket space
histogram. The second shows the effect of a single out-ofprofile packet on the bucket space histogram.
The simulation network consisted of a trusted subnet of
10 web servers connected to an untrusted internet of 1000
clients. In order to simulate typical network traffic, Spirent
TeraMetrics traffic generators running TeraCaw software
were used. This system is capable of simulating millions
of client/server sessions using various application level
protocols, beyond the initial three-way handshake. The
system was configured such that any where between 400
and 800 users (using the 100 client machines) would
randomly access the 10 web servers. Each web access
consisted of establishing a TCP connection with the
server, an HTTP GET message and then a 64-byte HTTP
Response message. The connection was then terminated
with a RESET.
The bucket space definition included a list of
“authorized” web servers, identified an address space
associated with trusted users, and considered ports below
1024 to be service ports. Consequently, for figures 5
through 9 the bucket space was partitioned as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A trusted IP address, a web server, and a service port
A trusted IP address, a web server, and not a service port
A trusted IP address, not a web server, and a service port
A trusted IP address, not a web server, and not a service
port
Not a trusted IP address and a service port
Not a trusted IP address and not a service port

Since the bucket space definition is aligned with the
actual traffic patterns, the number of non-zero bucket
states is small. Hence the histogram tail is very short.
Perhaps more importantly, this display also illustrates
the smoothing effect defined by the central limit theorem
on traffic that has been shown to be highly self-similar in
nature on a per-client basis ([8], [9]). In other words, even
though all clients arguably have the same heavy-tailed
exchange characteristics, the actual distribution of states
as shown by the bucket state histograms is highly normal
and smooth, particularly when the bucket definitions are
aligned with the configuration (i.e. all web servers in the
web server list).
Next an anomalous packet was injected into the
network for each during the above scenario. The
anomalous packet was an UDP packet from one of the
web servers to one of the clients. The packet originated
from an ephemeral port (1025) with a destination service
port on the client (53). Figure 6 shows the effect on the
bucket state histogram for this packet a scales comparable
to figure 5.

Fig 5.The bucket state histogram over time. Decreasing frequency of
bucket states comes out of the graphic. Traffic is confined to external
clients visiting internal web servers so the number of bucket states is
small.

The number of possible bucket states, N, can be
determined as:

 n + k − 1
N =

 n −1 

(1)

where n is the number of buckets and k is the number of
balls in the system. Thus for the experiments above, with
six buckets and initially four balls each (k = 24), there are
theoretically N = 118,755 possible bucket states.
In the control run the bucket space description matches
the actual network topography. Figure 5 illustrates the
average bucket sizes and bucket space histograms over a
period of two minutes (120 seconds). The typical load on
the network was approximately 1000 packets per second.
The bucket histogram is shown at two scales in this
example.

Fig 6. The bucket state histogram with a single UDP injected into the
over 200,000 web traffic packets. Compare to figure 5.

The difference caused by the anomaly of the UDP
packet should be readily apparent when comparing figures
5 and 6. Keep in mind that during this two minute period,
over 200,000 packets were exchanged. The reason for the
significant protrusion is because the UDP packet forces a
ball to be transferred to a state that would not otherwise be

visited, reducing the counts of the “normal” buckets and
altering the frequency of the histograms (hence the notch
in the signal response.)
The second experiment illustrates the effect when one
web server removed from the configuration file. This web
server is now in effect an unauthorized or rogue web
server. The top graphic in figure 7 shows the effect of
pulling the single server out of the web server group.
One immediately notes the significant variation in the
bucket state histogram when compared to figure 5. This is
due to the self-similar nature of the requests made to the
single rogue web server. This hypothesis becomes more
evident in lower graphics of figure 7 where two, four and
six web servers are removed from the “web server” list.
As we might expect, the increasing number of rogue
servers invokes the central limit theorem, producing an
increasingly smooth display. We do see and increasingly
larger number of active bucket states, however, due to the
larger variation in traffic characteristics.

removal of one (top, left), two (top, right), four (bottom, left) and six
(bottom, right) web servers from the web server list.

B. DARPA Lincoln Lab IDS Test Data
For analysis and configuration of the system we utilized
the Tcpdump files that were collected by Lincoln Labs
using their 1999 Simulation Network. Per references [10],
the simulation network was created to conduct evaluations
of intrusion detection systems by measuring detections
and false alarm rates.
Figure 9 shows the response to attack #41213446, an
ICMP flood or “Smurf” attack. This attack is very
common and generally easy to detect.

Fig. 9 Response of the system to an ICMP flood, #41213446.

Figure 10 displays the response to a Mailbomb attack,
#42155148. This is a denial of service attack directed
against the sendmail program. This is accomplished by
sending a unique set of strings to the sendmail server.

Fig 7. Bucket state histograms after the removal of one (top, left), two
(top, right), four (bottom, left) and six (bottom, right) web servers from
the web server list. Note the difference between these and the middle of
figure 7. As we remove more web servers from the “authorized” list we
see increasing smoothness in the display but also and increase in
frequency of bucket states.

Next a single UDP packet was injected into all of the
scenarios of figure 7. The resulting displays are found in
figure 8. Note how the UDP packet gets completely lost in
the variable traffic of a single server removed, but is still
quire prominent in all the others.

Fig 10. Response of the system to a Mailbomb attack, #42155148.

A similar type of attack to the Mailbomb is the Apache2
attack, #51140100. The response of the system to this
attack is shown in Figure 11.

Fig. 11. Response of the system to an Apache2 attack, #51140100.

Fig 8. Bucket state histograms for the traffic in figure 7 with a single
UDP injected amongst the 200,000 packets. Histograms shown after the

Finally, the response of the system to a sweep of IP
addresses is shown in figure 12. The shape of this
response is particularly worth noting.

Figure 14 illustrates the response due to the Code Red
worm in August 2002. This example is particularly
interesting in that it show how the character of the
network changed twice – once when the worm breached
the school’s network and then when the firewall was
shutdown due to detection of the breach.
IV. CONCLUSION

Fig. 12. Response of the system to an IP sweep, #52211313.

C. Operational network observations
Figure 13 depicts a flood of ICMP packets originating
inside a monitored operational network after normal
working hours. This flood increased the state count;
thereby producing a large spike on the GUI. This flood
consisted of 6,032 ICMP echo requests/replies within a
four second time frame. ICMP echo requests and replies
are not necessarily anomalous, however the owner of the
system was logged off and at home requiring notification
of the local CERT for further investigation.

We have presented a novel approach to characterizing
the conversation flow of a computer network using an
intelligent form of data reduction based on an Ehrenfest
urn model. This approach associates traffic of certain
characteristics with a category or bucket and observes the
transfer of information from one category to another.
Revealing behavior is identified by viewing the histogram
of the bucket states, or category arrangements, over time.
The approach has been evaluated on both simulated
laboratory traffic and operational network traffic.
More importantly, the experiments demonstrated how
this approach produces events that can be characterized by
Gaussian models. While most anomaly detectors try to
apply ML techniques to heavy tailed distributions (e.g.
looking at packet length), our approach produces a
statistic that can justifiably be analyzed with ML/MSE
estimators.
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